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I Introduction
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that the time has
come to recognize discrimination as a field of law, with its own place in
the books, the indexes, and the curriculum.
For an area to be identified as a field of law, two conditions should
be satisfied. First, the area should be large and important. Second, it
should display a coherent pattern and be held together by threads of
principle common to its component parts.
As to the size and importance of discrimination law, no one famil-
iar with legal developments of the past ten years will need convincing
that this condition is amply satisfied. Indeed, discrimination law may
well be the leading "growth industry" in current law practice. In em-
ployment discrimination, for example, the backlog of cases of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission this year passed the
130,000 mark, and the many state commissions have their own
backlogs in proportion. As to importance, a strikingly large share of
leading cases decided by the Supreme Court are in this category, with
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke' being only the best
known, and the same phenomenon is observable at the federal circuit
and district court levels.
The second condition, that of interrelation between the compo-
nents of the field, will therefore be the principal concern of this analy-
sis.
Let us first sketch the dimensions and pattern of those compo-
nents.
The pattern can be thought of as divided vertically and horizon-
tally according to two features: persons discriminated against, and ac-
tivities in which discrimination occurs.
As to persons, there are nine principal categories: race, sex, age,
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religion, national origin, alienage, handicap, homosexuality, and veter-
ans' preference.
As to activity, there are five main divisions: employment, educa-
tion, housing, public accommodations, and political and civil rights.
Needless to say, the relative importance of the different categories
of activity varies markedly as between the categories of persons. Thus,
while employment discrimination affects every one of the nine personal
categories, housing discrimination is mostly a racial matter, although
age, handicap, and homosexuality problems are not unknown.
Four pervading principles or issues will be used as examples of the
kind of threads that weave this field together: the disparate impact-in-
tent dichotomy; reasonable accommodation; individual versus collec-
tive standards; and compensatory discrimination.
I The Disparate Impact-Intent Dichotomy
The issue of intent is central to every category of discrimination.
There is some danger that this elementary principle may be obscured,
because of various efforts to objectify proof of what is ultimately a sub-
jective fact. But, whatever the method of proof, motive is still an indis-
pensable ingredient in the legal concept of discrimination. If I refuse to
hire you, or to rent you a house, that act is legally neutral in itself.
Before it can become legally tainted, one must ask why I turned you
away. And "why" is, of course, a subjective matter.' But there is no
way you can X-ray my brain and find tangible evidence that my motive
was racial.
The Supreme Court has made two major contributions to the proc-
ess of objectifying prima facie proof of the subjective fact of intent. In
McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green,3 the process of proof was objecti-
fied in individual employment discrimination suits by means of a four-
part formula for a prima facie case: the plaintiff belongs to a protected
group; the employer was seeking applicants of his qualifications; in
spite of his qualifications, plaintiff was rejected; the employer contin-
ued to seek applicants of his qualifications. Note that the need to es-
tablish subjective intent is thus neatly sidestepped.
Of much more versatile application has been the Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.4 rule: if an employment test has disparate impact on a mi-
nority group, and if the test has not been "validated" for job-related-
ness, the element of intent is deemed to have been prima facie
2. "The central focus of the inquiry in a case such as this is always whether the employer is
treating 'some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin.' " Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, -U.S.-, -, 98 S. Ct. 2943, 2949 (1978) (quot-
ing International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 (1977)).
3. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
4. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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demonstrated. One is considered to intend the normal consequences of
his acts. The test produces discrimination; the employer intends the
test; it follows that the employer intends the discrimination, since the
alternative explanation of use because of business necessity has not
been established. The disparate impact principle has been used or at-
tempted in a wide and growing variety of cases involving "neutral"
selection procedures - not only employment tests and educational re-
quirements,5 but arrest6 and conviction7 records, garnishment, 8 bank-
ruptcy9 or bad debt' records, height, weight" and agility"2 tests, drug
records,13 no-spouse rules,' 4 length-of-experience requirements,' use
of references, 16 and bans based on sickle-cell anemia 7 and male homo-
sexuality. 8
At about the time when the legal profession and the courts had
concluded that the Griggs disparate-impact rule was a principle of uni-
versal application in discrimination cases, the Supreme Court cut
across this seemingly consistent picture with a series of cases decreeing
that in constitutional cases the Griggs rule did not apply, and actual
intent to discriminate must be shown. Disparate impact alone was not
enough, although of course it was one factor to be weighed among
5. Griggs, id, also involved a high school diploma requirement as an alternative to the test.
See also Spurlock v. United Airlines, 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972), holding that, although a
college degree requirement for the job of airline pilot had disparate racial impact, job-relatedness
had been adequately proved.
6. Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970), aff'din relevant part,
472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972).
7. Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975).
8. Wallace v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1974).
9. Marshall v. District of Columbia, 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,349 (D.D.C. 1975). The case
failed because of absence of proof of disparate impact.
10. Robinson v. City of Dallas, 514 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1975). This case also failed on the
facts.
11. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977).
12. Hardy v. Stumpf, 21 Cal. 3d 1, 576 P.2d 1342, 145 Cal. Rptr. 176 (1978). The female
plaintiff won as to a 5'7" height requirement for police, but lost on the agility tests, including
scaling a 6-foot wall, which were held job-related.
13. See Beazer v. New York City Transit Auth., 399 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), af dand
supplemented on rehearing, 414 F. Supp. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), afl'd, 558 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. granted, 438 U.S. 904 (1978) (argued Dec. 6, 1978). A flat rejection as bus drivers of all
persons with a methadone treatment history was held unconstitutional - but not specifically as
race discrimination.
14. Yuhas v. Libby-Owens-Ford, 411 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Ill. 1976), rev'd, 562 F.2d 496 (7th
Cir. 1977). A no-spouse rule in practice excluded 71 women and only 3 men. The court of ap-
peals admitted that disparate impact had been shown, but held that a sufficient business justifica-
tion had been established. °
15. Schenectady v. State Div. of Human Resources, 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,449 (N.Y. Ct.
App. 1975).
16. EEOC v. National Academy of Sciences, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. 11,010 (D.D.C. 1976)
(adverse impact not proved).
17. Smith v. Olin Chem. Corp., 555 F.2d 1283 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc), reY'g 535 F.2d 863
(1976). In spite of the obvious disparate impact on blacks, the rule was held justified because of
the need for a strong back in the particular job.
18. Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 65 Cal. App. 3d 608, 135 Cal. Reptr.
465 (1977). A flat ban on homosexuals was attacked on the theory that, since there were more
male homosexuals than female, the ban constituted sex discrimination against males under the
disparate impact theory. The attack failed.
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others in considering the ultimate question of real intent. The
landmark decision that laid down the rule was an employment case,
Washington v. Davis. 9 But the cases in which it was quickly followed
were a housing case, Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous-
ing Development Corp.20 and a school busing case, Board of School
Commissioners v. Buckley.2 ' For purposes of the present theme as to
the interrelatedness of discrimination law, the point is that the control-
ling precedent in a housing case turned out to be found, not among
housing cases, but in an employment case, and the controlling prece-
dents in a school discrimination case were found to be, not among
other education cases, but in an employment and housing case.
The Arlington Heights sequel22 only confirms the fact that the most
useful source of law in a housing case may be nonhousing law. On the
remand, the Seventh Circuit in turn remanded to the district court for a
determination whether there had been a violation of the federal Fair
Housing Act of 1968, since, reasoned the court, this act would be analo-
gous to the employment title of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII,
under which Griggs was decided, and therefore actual intent would not
have to be proved under the 1968 act.
III Individual versus Collective Standards
A second pervading issue is that of individual versus collective
standards, particularly in the application of the bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ) exception.23 Here we encounter an unresolved
19. 426 U.S. 229 (1977).
The future importance of the Washington rule and of the distinction here discussed will de-
pend in no small measure on the answer to the question whether cases brought under the Recon-
struction Civil Rights Act, especially 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 (1976), are assimilated to
Washington or to Griggs. Certioriari has been granted in a case holding that actual intent need
not be shown in a section 1981 employment suit. Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334
(9th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 437 U.S. 903 (1978) (argued Dec. 5, 1978). But two circuits have
held that actual intent must be shown. Williams v. De Kalb County, 582 F.2d 2 (5th Cir. 1978);
United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1977). At least two district courts have
also imposed the actual intent requirement. Arnold v. Ballards, 448 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Ohio
1978); Lewis v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 440 F. Supp 949 (D. Md. 1977).
20. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
21. 429 U.S. 1068 (1977).
22. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir.
1977).
23. The Title VII BFOQ provision states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (I) it shall not be an unlaw-
ful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees. . . on the basis
of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or
national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the nor-
mal operation of that particular business or enterprise.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976).
Note that "race" is deliberately omitted from this exception.
The counterpart to this provision in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act is essentially
similar: "It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor organization-i)
to take any action otherwise prohibited . . . where age is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business. ... 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)
(1976).
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apparent conflict between the rule evolving in the two areas of sex dis-
crimination and age discrimination.
In sex discrimination law, the principle that has emerged from a
series of circuit court decisions24 is that each individual woman has a
right to be judged as an individual. Thus, an employer cannot assume
that, because perhaps ninety-eight percent of all women cannot lift one
hundred pounds, he can therefore bar all women from a job entailing
the lifting of one hundred pounds.
In Dothard v. Rawlinson,2 5 the Supreme Court summed up this de-
velopment: "But whatever the verbal formulation, the federal courts
have agreed that it is impermissible under Title VII to refuse to hire an
individual man or woman on the basis of stereotyped characterizations
of the sexes . "...26
Although in that passage the Court is not necessarily endorsing
these cases, there follows a passage in which the Court appears to speak
for itself: "In the usual case, the argument that a particular job is too
dangerous for women may appropriately be met by the rejoinder that it
is the purpose of Title VII to allow the individual woman to make that
choice for herself."
27
When we turn to the field of age discrimination, however, we find
bus companies flatly refusing to hire any driver over the age of thirty-
five in Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. ,28 or forty in Usery v. Tamiami
Trail Tours, Inc. ,29 and "getting away with it" in the circuit courts.
As confirming the present theme, we may first note that both cases
felt it necessary to begin with Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Tele-
graph Co. 30 and to distinguish the sex discrimination cases. This they
did by injecting the added consideration of the safety of the bus passen-
gers. This is undoubtedly a valid factor, but from that point on the age
cases have developed rules that vary markedly in their strictness.
The Seventh Circuit held that, to sustain a flat maximum hiring
age, Greyhound need only show that it had a rational basis in fact to
believe that elimination of this maximum hiring age would increase the
likelihood of risk to its passengers and the public.
The Fifth Circuit adopted a two-part rule: the employer must
show either that all or substantially all (the Weeks formula) persons
over the particular age are unable to perform the duties of the job
24. Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971); Bowe v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228
(5th Cir. 1969).
25. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
26. Id at 333.
27. Id. at 335 (citing Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1977); Bowe v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408
F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1959)).
28. 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974).
29. 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
30. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
19791
418 Washburn Law Journal [Vol. 18
safely and efficiently, or that some older persons have traits precluding
safe and efficient performance unascertainable other than through
knowledge of the person's age. A stunning paradox contributing to the
contemporary instability of this field is that while, by application of this
formula, the Fifth Circuit upheld an across-the-board maximum hiring
age of forty for bus drivers, the Eighth Circuit in Houghton v. McDon-
nel-Douglas Corp. , ' by an application of the same formula (a stricter
application) rejected the defense as to a fifty-two-year-old pilot whose
job was testing experimental supersonic aircraft! It is idle to try to dis-
tinguish the cases on the safety-to-the-public factor. Plainly, a jet plane
crashing in a metropolitan area could cause much more loss of life than
a bus running into the ditch. The principal difference was that the
court in Houghton insisted on hard proof that test pilots - not just
people in general - deteriorate with age. The plaintiff adduced im-
pressive evidence proving just the opposite. In Tamiami, however, the
court was content to rely on data as to the effects of age on the general
population. Moreover, there was a much more convincing demonstra-
tion of the feasibility of detecting relevant physical disabilities in
Houghton than in Tamiami.
Of course, everything depends on what the Supreme Court says
when these conflicts inevitably reach it. On the strength of Dothard,
one may predict with some assurance that, in the nonsafety cases, the
Court will follow the individual rather than the collective or stereotype
approach. Thus, in an age case, if the occupation involved climbing
telephone poles, the Court will probably say that a fifty-year-old appli-
cant should have the right to decide for himself if he wants to try it, and
should be hired if as an individual he proves he can do the job.
As to the safety cases, the Court acknowledged in Dothard that
this was a relevant factor. But in forecasting whether the Court will
embrace the loose test of Greyhound, the moderately loose test of
Tamiami, or the stricter test of Houghton, one has only general expres-
sions of the Court to rely on. These expressions consistently stress that
the BFOQ should be construed narrowly.
In Dothard, the Court said: "We are persuaded-by the restrictive
language of § 703e, the relevant legislative history, and the consistent
interpretation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion-that the BFOQ exception was in fact meant to be an extremely
narrow exception to the general prohibition on the basis of sex." 32
In a footnote, the Court cites the EEOC Guideline stating that the
BFOQ "should be interpreted narrowly." 33
31. 553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1977).
32. 433 U.S. at 334 (footnotes omitted).
33. Id. at 334 n.19 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1977)).
Discrimination Law
One cannot resist pointing out the enthusiasm with which the
Court has intensified even the EEOC's "narrowly" to its own "ex-
tremely narrow." Whatever else may be said of the Greyhound "ra-
tional basis" rule, it cannot by any stretch of language be called a
"narrow" interpretation of the BFOQ clause-much less "extremely
narrow." The only one of the three circuit court cases that comes close
to fitting this description is Houghton-and for this reason there is good
reason to expect that the ultimate rule to emerge will at least be no
looser than that in Houghton, for both age and sex BFOQ determina-
tions.
IV Reasonable Accommodation
A third thread intersecting some of the discrimination areas is the
principle of "reasonable accommodation." For the time being, the
most important question is the extent to which doctrines developed for
religious discrimination will be carried over to handicap discrimina-
tion.
When Title VII was first passed, with its ban on religious discrimi-
nation in employment, it may have been thought that such discrimina-
tion would take the "I-won't-hire-you-because-you're-a-Catholic"
form. It soon became apparent that this was not to be the main prob-
lem. Almost all cases proved to center on religious practices, such as
observing Saturday Sabbaths, rather than on religious identifications or
theological beliefs. Accordingly, a specific amendment was added in
1972: "The term 'religion' includes all aspects of religious observance
and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he
is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective
employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on
the conduct of the employer's business."
34
In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,5 a case involving the
problem of adjusting work schedules to meet the needs of an employee
whose religion forbade working on Saturday, the Supreme Court deter-
mined that it would have been an "undue hardship" on the employer to
make the accommodation. The union had balked at allowing Hardison
a shift preference that would have solved his problem, since this would
have violated the collective bargaining agreement. The employer
would not excuse Hardison on Saturday, because that would have im-
paired the functioning of his work area. Nor could another employee
be shifted to fill in for him since this would have undermanned some
other work area or required paying of overtime wages.
The key to the Court's holding is the following remarkable sen-
34. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, § 701(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1976).
35. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
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tence: "To require TWA to bear more than a de minimis cost in order to
give Hardison Saturdays off is an undue hardship. 36
Quite understandably, some lawyers and courts jumped to the
conclusion that there was virtually nothing left of "reasonable accom-
modation." It became necessary to remind employers, as the Seventh
Circuit did in Redmond v. GAF Corp. ,3 that they must still show that
they tried to make some accommodation. But, even so, it remains true
that the authoritative interpretation of "reasonable accommodation,"
like that of BFOQ, is "extremely narrow."
The principal federal statute on handicap discrimination in em-
ployment is the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,38 covering recipients of
government contracts and grants, and government agencies. Regula-
tions issued under this Act contain a provision that the contractor must
make: "reasonable accommodation to the physical and mental limita-
tions of an employee or applicant unless the contractor can demon-
strate that such an accommodation would impose an undue hardship
on the conduct of the contractor's business."3 9
Since this regulation was issued subsequent to the 1972 Title VII
amendment on "reasonable accommodation" in religion cases, and
since the operative words, such as "undue hardship," are identical, the
question that jumps out of the page is: Will the Supreme Court carry
over to physical handicap discrimination the Hardison rule equating de
minimis cost with undue hardship? If it does, the protection afforded
by the Rehabilitation Act will itself become de minimis. But if it does
not, the Court will have to articulate some reason why the same words
mean one thing when applied to religious discrimination and another
thing when applied to handicap discrimination.
As yet no significant case law has appeared on what "reasonable
accommodation" means in the context of employment discrimination
against the handicapped. The nearest thing to a detailed description of
what might be entailed is a list of examples provided by a Labor De-
partment spokesman of accommodations that might be deemed reason-
able depending on the particular contractor's circumstances:
Modify building architecture to include wheelchair ramps,
wider bathroom stalls, and raised door numbers for the blind;
Install alternative warning devices for the deaf and the blind;
Eliminate heat-activated elevators and replace them with eleva-
tors that persons with artificial limbs can operate;
Initiate an outside interviewing and application process to make
the contractor more accessible to the handicapped;
36. Id at 84 (footnote omitted).
37. 574 F.2d 897 (7th Cir. 1978).
38. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1976).
39. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(d) (1977).
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Institute alternative testing methods for handicapped persons
who can't take traditional tests, i.e., oral tests for the blind;
Restructure job duties where possible;
Create opportunities for job-sharing, part-time work, and work
at home where possible; and
Purchase special aids for the handicapped to help them to do the
job, such as special telephones for the blind.4°
This is a far cry from de minimis. Whatever the outcome, one may
be sure that the first line of defense of any employer charged with inad-
equate accommodating of the handicapped will be a religion case,
Hardison.
V Compensatory Discrimination
The terms "compensatory discrimination" and "reverse discrimi-
nation" are sometimes used interchangeably, but they are not entirely
synonymous. Reverse discrimination is the broader concept, and in-
deed includes compensatory discrimination, but also includes more.
The most inclusive issue covered by the term "reverse discrimina-
tion" is the question whether statutory and constitutional guarantees
should be limited to the minorities whose plight originally impelled
their adoption. Gradually it has become well established that they are
not, in a wide variety of situations cutting across a number of discrimi-
nation categories. Thus, males can invoke sex discrimination statutes,
as in the airline cabin attendant cases.4 Whites can invoke Title VII in
employment cases,42 and the fourteenth amendment and Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 in college admissions cases, 43 and can even
invoke section 1981, which guarantees "all persons" the same contract
rights as "white citizens."'  Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that
whites have standing to challenge race discrimination in housing
cases.45 Once more it may be observed that anyone briefing a reverse
discrimination question in any category would obviously be missing
some important precedents if he failed to realize that the principles
found in, say, employment cases might be of value in education or
housing cases.
This kind of reverse discrimination has no philosophical, social, or
ethical content. It is usually nothing more than giving a literal meaning
to the words of a statute. Discrimination against whites is based on
race, and discrimination against males is based on sex - and that is
that. The point may be highlighted by adducing the one partial excep-
40. Daily Labor Report, No. 64, Apr. 1, 1977, at A-4.
41. E.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971).
42. Eg., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
43. E.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
44. E.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
45. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
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tion to the operation of this simple rationale. Reverse discrimination
against persons outside the forty to seventy age group is impossible
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).46 If one
were to read no further than the primary operative section of the Act
forbidding discrimination because of age, one might conclude, by anal-
ogy to the similar language of Title VII, that a twenty-year-old rejected
because of an employer policy of hiring no one under forty could com-
plain that he was indeed discriminated against "because of age." But
the ADEA has something the other acts lack: a specific section limiting
its protection to those within the forty to seventy age bracket.47 Within
that age span, however, there may be illicit discrimination in either di-
rection, direct or reverse. The Labor Department Regulation explicitly
cites the example of two men, one forty-two and the other fifty-two,
and states that the employer may not turn down either in favor of the
other on the ground of age.
48
Compensatory discrimination is a narrower and more controver-
sial concept than plain reverse discrimination, but it too pervades many
of the segments of discrimination law. In simplest terms, the idea is
that, when a group has been systematically disadvantaged by force of
law for centuries, it is not enough merely to say: "We repeal the offen-
sive laws and discontinue the offensive practices starting today; now let
everybody compete on the basis of merit alone." It is not enough to
say, "Let the footrace from now on go to the swiftest," when at the
moment the gun is sounded, the starting-point some of the runners is
hundreds of yards behind that of others.
In employment, the principal expression of the compensatory prin-
ciple is "affirmative action." Employers and unions with a record of
past discrimination must do more than just refrain from discriminating
in the future. They must try to make up for the past by going out of
their way to recruit, train, and hire members of minority groups. The
counterpart in public school desegregation is, of course, the rule that it
is not enough for a once-segregated school to stop deliberately segre-
gating, or even to adopt a "freedom of choice" policy;49 it must undo
the effects of its past discrimination by an array of positive devices,
including busing, to achieve a unitary and nondiscriminatory5 ° system.
The most recent focal point of the controversy is college admissions,
with preferential admissions for minorities in professional schools
figuring in two cases reaching the Supreme Court, De Funis v. Odegard
51 and Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.52 Other exam-
46. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976).
47. Id § 631.
48. 29 C.F.R. § 860.91(b) (1977).
49. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
50. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
51. 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973), vacated as moot, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
52. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
[Vol. .18
Discrimination Law
pies of compensatory discrimination may be found in housing, with
attempts to undo past injustice by providing minorities with a greater
share of public housing, and in business, through the Minority Business
Enterprise ten-percent set-aside in the Public Works Employment
Act.
5 3
Once more, the point for present purposes is that the arguments
and precedents on both sides are carried over between the different cat-
egories. The very validity of the compensatory principle involves the
same considerations in all. Thus, the propriety of deliberately using
race as a basis for "discrimination," although benevolent, continues to
come under attack, although one might have thought that the issue was
put to rest once and for all by the clear and unanimous holding and
language in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education.5 4
The familiar dispute about "quotas," and the tiresome quibble that
"this is not a quota, just a goal," similarly make their appearance in all
these areas, and no doubt will continue to do so, in spite of the equally
clear discrediting of this quibble in Justice Powell's Bakke opinion.55
By far the most important unanswered question as to compensa-
tory discrimination is the extent of the impact of Bakke on affirmative
action in employment discrimination. Indeed, it is quite possible that
the future practical significance of Bakke will loom much larger in the
area of preferential employment measures than in its immediate area of
preferential college admissions.56
The possible impact of Bakke on "affirmative action" may be con-
sidered under three headings: affirmative action plans imposed as a
condition of obtaining a government contract; affirmative measures de-
creed by courts as part of the remedy for proved past discrimination;
and preferential schemes voluntarily adopted by employers.
Of the three, the first is the least vulnerable. Affirmative action has
always been the very heart of Executive Order No. 11246 on govern-
ment contracts, and its constitutionality has been taken for granted
since Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of
53. 42 U.S.C. § 6705(0(2) (1976).
54. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. Of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
55. "This semantic distinction is beside the point . Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. at 289.
56. A general discussion of Bakke will not be undertaken here, in view of the abundance of
material already available. The most perceptive analysis up to this point is found in Van Alstyne,
A Preliminary Review of the Bakke Case, 64 AM. A. U. PROFESSORs BULL. 286 (No. 4, 1978). One
of the principal themes of this critique is the extreme instability of the decision itself and of the
legal situation it leaves in its wake. For example, Prof. Van Alstyne demonstrates convincingly
that the identical justices, confronted with identical facts could, without legal strain and without
damage to stare decisis, now reach exactly the opposite result! If this is so as to the precise case
decided, one need hardly belabor how much harder it is to foretell what the Court will do when
the facts and even the entire category of discrimination are different. Still, one must make the best
possible try, since the potential stakes, particularly in the employment and minority business
felds, are enormous.
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Labor,5 7 upholding the "Philadelphia Plan."
The second use of affirmative action, as a Title VII remedy, has a
slightly shakier base. This is because the remedy section of that Title
contains language which, at first glance, might seem to rule out prefer-
ential hiring expressly:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to re-
quire any employer . . . to grant preferential treatment to any indi-
vidual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin of such individual or group on account of an imbal-
ance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage
of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin em-
ployed by any employer. . . in comparison with the total number or
percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin in. . . the available work force ....
One after another, however, eight circuits have interpreted this
section to forbid preferential hiring only when the imbalance came
about competely without regard to the actions of the employer.59 This
is known as "natural" imbalance. An "artificial" imbalance, permitting
affirmative action, occurs when the employer's intentional hiring prac-
tices have created - intentionally or unintentionally - the dispropor-
tionately low minority representation. The Supreme Court has not yet
spoken on this issue, but if, for the kind of broad reasons that made
Bakke controversial, the Court wished to reverse the circuits, a legal
formulation would not be hard to find. The Court could merely rule
that the quoted passage means what it says, that it speaks only of "an
imbalance which may exist" in fact and draws no distinction based on
what caused the imbalance, and that if such a distinction is to be drawn
it should be written in by Congress, not read in by courts.
That this possibility is not entirely far-fetched is suggested by the
Fourth Circuit's disposition of the post-Bakke case of Sledge v. J P.
Stevens & Co..6 In this decision, the Fourth Circuit, which is one of
the two circuits that has not yet adopted the majority "natural-imbal-
ance" rule,6 reversed a quota hiring remedy under Title VII because of
doubts based on Bakke.
The third affirmative action problem may prove to be the most
57. 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1976).
59. They are the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuits. See
2 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 57.10, at 11-86 n.75 (1978), for complete citations.
60. 585 F.2d 625 (4th Cir. 1978).
It may also be noted that one district court has, on the strength of Bakke, held unconstitu-
tional the Minority Business Enterprise ten-percent set-aside provision in the 1977 Public Works
Employment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6705(0(2) (1976). Association Gen. Contractors v. Secretary of
Commerce, No. 77-3738-AAH (D.C. Cal. Oct. 20, 1978).
61. See, e.g., Lewis v. Tobacco Workers' Int'l Union, 577 F.2d 1135 (4th Cir. 1978), which is
not directly contra on preferential hiring as such, but which reversed a district court requirement
that an employer, guilty of prior flagrant discrimination, affirmatively inform black employees of
the availability of better positions in other departments - as long as employees of all races were
treated alike in this respect.
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legally interesting of all. It is exemplified by Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum
Co.,62 a case that was widely discussed in the press at the time of the
Bakke decision as perhaps the next major Bakke-type test case.63 In
order to avoid possible future litigation and to comply with Office of
Federal Contract Compliance guidelines, Kaiser and the United Steel-
workers entered into a collective bargaining agreement which con-
tained an "affirmative action" clause. The agreement removed the
requirement of prior craft experience for on-the-job training and insti-
tuted an entrance ratio of one minority worker to one white worker for
craft positions until the percentage of minority craft workers approxi-
mated the percentage of minority population around the plant. Two
seniority lists are kept, solely for determining eligibility for on-the-job
training. An unsuccessful white bidder with greater seniority than a
successful black brought a class action suit alleging that Kaiser and the
Steelworkers were violating Title VII. After finding that the company
had not previously engaged in acts of discrimination, the district court
enjoined the company and the union from implementing the clause on
two grounds: first, while the judiciary may establish affirmative action
programs as a form of relief, the employer and union violated Title VII
by voluntarily adopting the quota system; second, the court would not
mandate a quota system here, because the preferred workers were not
identifiable victims of hiring discrimination. The circuit court affirmed
on the second ground, but rejected the first. The court stated that "soci-
etal discrimination," not employment discrimination, was involved:
Where admissions to the craft on-the-job training are admittedly and
purely functions of seniority and that seniority is untainted by prior
discriminatory acts, the one-to-one ratio, whether designated by
agreement. . . or by order of the court, has no foundation in restora-
tive justice, and its preference for training minority workers thus vio-
lates Title VII.64
The court also ruled that if Executive Order 11246 mandated ra-
cial quotas for the Kaiser program in the absence of any prior employ-
ment discrimination, the order must fall before the direct congressional
prohibition found in Title VII. It will be noted that this case resembles
Bakke both in the mechanics of the plan and in the fundamental philo-
sophical issue. The two-track plan, in which one track was completely
inaccessible to whites, is strongly reminiscent of the similar separate
tracks for applicants to Davis medical school. And the view that indi-
vidual employers, not themselves guilty of past discrimination, cannot
voluntarily take it on themselves to atone for "societal discrimination"
seems to be the direct employment counterpart to the Bakke result-in
that only four justices embraced the Brennan opinion view approving
62. 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. 720 (1978).
63. Id
64. Id. at 226.
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"Davis' articulated purpose of remedying the effects of past societal
discrimination .... 65
Of course, it is theoretically possible that one of the four justices
who joined in the Stevens opinion,66 which rested exclusively on Title
VI and carefully avoided expressing any opinion on the constitutional
issue, might join with the "Brennan four," and thus make up a five-
man majority for the philosophical view that remedying past societal
discrimination is a valid justification for reverse-discriminatory action.
If this constitutional view were then imported into the statutory prob-
lem in Weber, the stage would be set for a reversal.
On the other hand, there are two strands visible in recent Supreme
Court opinions that may be developing a different pattern.
One strand may be put colloquially: "If you are not part of the
problem, you cannot be made to be part of the solution." The theme
dates from the first Milliken v. Bradley,67 the Detroit school integration
case. This case held that, although no really meaningful racial balance
could have been achieved by reshuffling school children within the
heavily-black school system of Detroit proper, it was impermissible to
solve that problem by drawing into the integration plan the contiguous
white suburbs, in the absence of proof in the record that these suburbs
had themselves engaged in racial discrimination contributing to the
problem. This theme has been consistently applied in a number of sub-
sequent cases.
This strand reappears strongly in the Powell Bakke opinion. Da-
vis had itself been guilty of no past discrimination. Hence its avowed
motivation had to be one of remedying societal injustice.68 Powell re-
views a wide array of cases, 69 drawn from school desegregation, em-
ployment discrimination, sex discrimination, political rights
discrimination, and the like, always with the same conclusion: general
societal discrimination will not support affirmative action, for example,
by a specific employer at the expense of a specific employee.
This leads to the second strand, somewhat related, which is a
growing concern with the question: assuming that some kind of com-
pensation is owed, who should pay it? Professor Van Alstyne in his
preliminary analysis of Bakke for the American Association of Univer-
sity Professors puts the matter pointedly:
Viewed head on, as a modus operandi for the amortization of the
racial national debt, without doubt there is much about the Davis
65. 438 U.S. at 362.
66. It is quite clear that Justice Powell does not agree with the general "societal" approach:
"But we have never approved preferential classifications in the absence of proved constitutional or
statutory violations." Id. at 302.
67. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
68. 438 U.S. at 306.
69. Id. at 300-03.
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plan that is plainly repugnant. For one thing, it represents a most
peculiar view of apportioning the burdens of providing racial restitu-
tion. The 'benefits' of that racism for which the Davis plan presumes
to make partial group restitution are diffused in the 'unjust' enrich-
ment of all white Californians including most certainly the engineers
of this compensatory scheme, i.e., the (predominantly white) faculty
and administration of the Davis medical school. Yet, the over-
whelming majority of all such white persons give up nothing in con-
tribution to the amortization of that debt. They pay no higher taxes,
the faculty teach no greater loads, they supervise no larger number of
students, they personally forgo no perquisites or emoluments, and
indeed may themselves even profit from their own plan - insofar as
it provides them with an enhanced sense of self-esteem and peer
group approval. Rather, the Davis plan presumes to impose 100% of
the 'debt' it is to amortize on a hapless number of impersonally cho-
sen surrogates from whom admission-gate transfer payments are thus
to be made. The Allen Bakkes and Marco Defunises alone step
aside.
There is, of course, no evidence that any of them benefitted dis-
proportionately (if indeed at all) from the racism it is now their ex-
clusive distinction to amortize; there is no evidence that any of them
are better able to afford the cost than others.7 °
Precisely the same misgivings, translated into the employment
counterpart, have been haunting the courts, from the Supreme Court
on down, throughout most of the history of affirmative action. If a sen-
iority system is struck down as discriminatory in effect, or if a quota
system of some kind is imposed, it is not the employer who feels the
sting-he continues to operate his plant with employees of presumably
the same level of competence. Much less is it the consumer or the pub-
lic at large. The entire "debt" is assumed by the individual white em-
ployee who loses his job in the name of societal reparation.
Justice Powell's reference to this carryover between the employ-
ment and the college admissions problem accordingly takes on special
importance here. He referred to the leading case, Franks v. Bowman
Construction Co. , " in which the court had found it necessary to hurt
some coemployees in order to fashion the requisite remedy of construc-
tive seniority for blacks, but the overt emphatic exclusion of societal
discrimination as the source of the wrong to be remedied:
[Iln Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976),
we approved a retroactive award of seniority to a class of Negro
truckdrivers who had been the victims of discrimination-not just
by society at large, but by the respondent in that case. While this
relief imposed some burdens on other employees, it was held neces-
sary " 'to make [the victims] whole for injuries suffered on account of
unlawful employment discrimination.' ",2
70. Van Alstyne, A Preliminary Review of the Bakke Case, 64 AM. A. U. PROFESSORS BULL.
286 (No. 4, 1978) (emphasis added).
71. 424 U.S. 747 (1975).
72. 438 U.S. at 301 (quoting Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976) (quot-
ing Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975))).
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Note the double insistence on identifying both the person who
caused the discrimination and the person who suffered from it.
In the. later case of International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States,7 3 however, the Supreme Court limited Franks by hold-
ing that it afforded no remedy to the victims of a bona fide seniority
system to the extent that it "locked in" pre-Act discrimination. And
even beyond this, it discussed at length the problem of "the legitimate
expectations of nonvictim employees." It concluded that a proper bal-
ance would have to be worked out by the district court under "basic
principles of equity," drawing on "qualities of mercy and practical-
ity."7
4
At the minimum, this means that, in any final disposition of the
affirmative action dilemma in the light of Bakke, it will not be auto-
matically assumed that the displacement and disadvantaging of "inno-
cent" white employees must be accepted as an unfortunate but
inevitable by product of vindicating the rights of minority members.
V. Practical Conclusions as to Books and Indexes
Quite apart from the intellectual satisfaction of constructing a co-
hesive and interrelated field of law out of the somewhat scattered
materials of discrimination law, the practical benefit would lie in facili-
tating the briefing of discrimination issues, and particularly in ensuring
that precedents from related areas, as in the examples here adduced,
are exploited to the full.
The two headings under which discrimination has in the past been
uneasily squeezed are civil rights and constitutional law. Neither one
works well any more, if indeed it ever did. The trouble with the civil
rights categorization is that the classification covers such a vast and
varied assortment of subjects - from rights of prisoners to Jehovah's
Witness handbills, and from academic freedom to hair length of na-
tional guardsmen - that it does not afford a sufficiently meaningful
and usable reference point. As for constitutional law, most constitu-
tional law is not discrimination law, and most discrimination law is not
constitutional law. With the exception of the original substantive law
of school segregation, the field has become almost entirely statutory.
With the inclusion of state and local governments, including school dis-
tricts, within such statutes as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the need to resort to
constitutional remedies in such matters as sex discrimination involving
teachers, or mandatory retirement for policemen and firemen, has di-
minished sharply.
73. 431 U.S. 324 (1977). The holdings at the circuit court level had all been contra.
74. Id. at 375.
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The obvious solution for a digest, key number, or similar system
would be to begin by adopting the single overall heading of discrimina-
tion. Below that heading, the next level of headings could be the five
major categories of activity in which discrimination occurs - employ-
ment, education, housing, public accommodations and facilities, and
political and civil rights - with perhaps a catch-all category added.
Under these could be placed the nine personal categories persons to the
extent they are applicable: race, sex, national origin, religion, age,
handicap, homosexuality and veterans, again with a catch-all. Alter-
natively, these layers could be reversed. The first arrangement is prob-
ably the best from the practicing lawyer's point of view, since an area
like say, employment discrimination, is already identifiable as a field of
practice.7 5
Vii Practical Conclusions as to Curriculum
The principal curricular implication of the present analysis is that
there should be at least one specific course on discrimination in the law
school curriculum.
If two or more courses are possible, the two possible ways of ar-
ranging the material resemble those just sketched for books and in-
dexes.
The division can be by classes of persons discriminated against.
This would mean, at the minimum, a course in race discrimination in
all its aspects, and a course in sex discrimination in all its aspects. Sev-
eral casebooks tailored to this approach are available. The author has
been using this pattern for thirteen years, and it seems to work satisfac-
torily, with some adjustments to be noted in a moment.
Alternatively, the course could be based on the category of activity
involved. Here the commonest example by far is combining in a single
course all species of employment discrimination - by sex, race, age,
handicap, religion, etc. Again, there are several casebooks available,
some with particular emphasis on problems of practice.
It follows from the theme of this article, however, that either of
these arrangements, adhered to literally, would miss a great deal of rel-
evant and indeed crucial law, both in the form of past precedents, and
particularly in the form of principles destined to control future contro-
versies.
The author has attempted to meet this problem in two ways, and
conversations with others in the field reveal that comparable devices
have been found useful in many schools.
The first device is a feature which might be called "discrimination
75. The author's four-volume A. LARSON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DIS-
CRIMINATION (1978) is accordingly arranged on this pattern.
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law in the news." The papers are combed each week for developments
in all areas of discrimination, and the first fifteen or twenty minutes of
a class period are devoted to discussing the legal implications of the
news story. It is nothing short of astonishing to discover the wealth of
material that emerges in this way. If one uses the news item as a core,
and then surrounds that core with the principal framework of law sug-
gested by the item, by the end of the term it will probably be discovered
that at least a rudimentary acquaintance with the entire field of dis-
crimination law has been supplied. For example, in the November,
1978, elections, there were three referenda of different types bearing on
"Gay Rights." By the time one had analyzed the decisional and legis-
lative background, and the significance of the varying results of the
ballots, one had done a virtually definitive job on the law of discrimi-
nation based on homosexuality. Needless to say, there is the added
advantage that the very presence of a legal controversy in the day's
news enlivens the subject and stimulates discussion.
The other device that has proved useful to enrich and diversify
discrimination courses is to allow students to select topics for seminar
papers from, not just the area covered by the course, but from any
branch of discrimination law. Some of these may be presented by stu-
dents from time to time at appropriate points in the course, again re-
vealing the links to related discrimination areas that might be missed if
a too-rigid arrangement of the material were adhered to.
VIII. Conclusion
Certainly we are well on our way to the recognition of discrimina-
tion as a field of law that is the concern of this article. One evidence is
the proliferation of case books, looseleaf services, newsletters, treatises,
courses, symposia, and conferences dealing with all or part of the area.
Another is the conspicuous increase in the disposition of courts to ex-
tract principles and precedents from one branch of the subject to bol-
ster its analysis of another. In Justice Powell's Bakke opinion, for ex-
ample, we may observe this salutary tendency carried to full flower: in
support of a college-admissions issue analysis he adduces not only pub-
lic school desegregation cases, but precedents as to Title VII employ-
ment discrimination, discrimination under government contracts,
housing discrimination, sex discrimination in Social Security and other
areas, linguistic discrimination, discrimination against American Indi-
ans, and political discrimination against a Jewish community in
redrawing voting districts.76
It is hoped that the present brief summary of the field of discrimi-
76. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 301-05 (1978).
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nation law and of some of the strands that knit it together will help
reinforce this trend, to the end that this young, sprawling, vigorous new
entry in the legal lexicon will begin to emerge as a more orderly and
manageable area of law.
